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AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS:   
TAKING THE  HUMAN OUT  OF  INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
James Foy* 
ABSTRACT 
Once confined to science fiction, killer robots will soon be a reality. Both the 
USA and the UK are currently developing weapons systems that may be  
capable of autonomously targeting and killing enemy combatants within the 
next 25 years. According to Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention 
and customary international law, weapons systems must be capable of operat-
ing within the principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This 
paper will demonstrate that without significant restrictions on the use of au-
tonomous weapons systems (AWS) or the creation of a new legal framework, 
the use of AWS is problematic. First, there are legitimate concerns that AWS 
are, by their nature, incapable of adhering to IHL principles. Second, there is 
a more fundamental problem: the principles of IHL are actually insufficient 
to address the unique concerns regarding AWS. Finally, the solutions pro-
posed by proponents of AWS do not sufficiently address these concerns. A 
legal solution beyond the general principles of IHL must be developed. 
Citation: (2014) 23 Dal J Leg Stud 47. 
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Introduction 
The term Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) conjures up images of Termina-
tor style robots: lethal machines with complicated artificial intelligence, capable of killing 
humans without being hindered by human emotion or cultural constraints. This picture 
is more science fiction than reality, but current challenges raised by the development of 
AWS are now at the forefront of international legal discourse and their compliance with 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) are real and must be addressed.  
In October 2010, a United Nations human rights investigator recommended “[t]he 
international community urgently…address the legal, political, ethical and moral impli-
cations of the development of lethal robotic technologies.”1 On November 19, 2012, 
Human Rights Watch, a division of the International Human Rights Clinic, released a 
report, Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots, calling for a ban on the production 
and use of AWS.2 Days later, the US Department of Defence (DoD) released Directive 
3000.09, outlining the DoD’s policies on the development and use of AWS.3 On April 
9, 2013, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions 
called for a moratorium on the development of AWS until a legal framework is devel-
oped.4 While Human Rights Watch, the DoD and the UN disagree on a solution, they 
all begin with the presumption that AWS will raise challenges of adherence to IHL. 
This paper will demonstrate that the principles of IHL, particularly the principles of 
distinction and proportionality, are not adequate to address the concerns raised by 
AWS. Part I will define AWS, distinguish between automatic and autonomous systems, 
and provide an overview of the current and future use of semi-autonomous and auton-
omous systems. Part II will outline the principles of distinction and proportionality in 
IHL. Part III will analyze the challenges of adherence to IHL principles faced by the use 
of AWS. It will address some, but not all, of the moral objections to AWS.5 Part IV will 
evaluate current proposals for operational solutions and offer legal solutions to ensure 
that the use of AWS does not violate the principles of IHL. This paper concludes that 
the principles of IHL are insufficient on their own and that an additional legal frame-
work is necessary to ensure the legal use of AWS.  
The analysis in this paper is confined to lethal AWS. Non-lethal robots raise their 
own concerns, particularly in the area of privacy, but they are outside of the scope of 
this paper. This paper focuses on the legal and moral implications of transferring the 
decision to kill from human to machine, rather than the wider implications of the  
automatization of robotic technology. There are also concerns that the existing princi-
ples of command responsibility are not sufficient to ensure that AWS comply with the 
principles of IHL. This topic is beyond of the scope of this paper.6 
                                                                                                                                            
1 Patrick Worsnip, “UN Official Calls for Study of Ethics, Legality of Unmanned Weapons”, The Washington 
Post (24 October 2010), online: Washington Post <http://www.washingtonpost.com>. 
2 Human Rights Watch, Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots, online: International Human Rights 
Clinic <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload_0_0.pdf>. 
3 US, Department of Defense, Directive Number 3000.09: Autonomy in Weapon Systems (21 November 2012), 
online: <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf> [DoD 3000.09].  
4 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UNHRC, 23d Sess, 
UN Doc A/HRC/23/47 (2013).  
5 For a thorough introduction to the challenges raised by AWS, see Armin Krishnan, Killer Robots: Legality and 
Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009). 
6 For an introduction to this topic, see Robert Sparrow, “Killer Robots” (2007) 24:1 Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 62. 
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I. WHAT ARE AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS? 
It is necessary to distinguish between weapons that are automated and weapons 
that are truly autonomous. The term “autonomous” can be difficult to define. It sug-
gests highly intelligent robots that are capable of individual decision-making. In reality, it 
looks less like science fiction and more like every day robotics.7 AWS may be much 
closer in operation to a driverless car than to a Terminator. 
Defining AWS 
Roboticist Noel Sharkey defines an automatic machine as one that “carries out a 
pre-programmed sequence of operations or moves in a structured environment.”8 By 
contrast, an autonomous machine operates in an unstructured environment. In es-
sence, what makes a machine autonomous is the environment it operates in, rather than 
its internal processes.  
The DoD adopts a broad definition of AWS:  
A weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without 
further intervention by a human operator. This includes human-supervised 
autonomous weapon systems that are designed to allow human operators to 
override operation of the weapon system, but can select and engage targets 
without further input after activation.9 
The DoD definition’s essential requirement is that, once activated, it can “select 
and engage targets” without further human input.10 Human Rights Watch adopts a 
similar definition: any robot that can select and engage targets without human input, 
even if there is human oversight, will qualify as a “fully autonomous robot.”11 These 
definitions capture the primary characteristic of AWS; that is, humans are not necessary 
in the targeting decision-making process.  
The core difference between automatic and autonomous weapons is predictability. 
An automatic machine is entirely predictable (barring a failure), whereas an autonomous 
robot can only be predictable as a series of likely outcomes. This distinction is essential 
in determining whether AWS are capable of adhering to the principles of IHL.  
AWS: New Weapons, or New Soldiers? 
The rise of AWS has the potential to develop in two different directions: either as 
an extension of human soldiers or as a replacement for humans in the battlefield.12 In 
                                                                                                                                            
7 Noel Sharkey, “Automating Warfare: Lessons Learned from the Drones” (2011) 21 Journal of Law, Infor-
mation & Science 140 at 141 [Sharkey, “Automating Warfare”].  
8 Ibid.  
9 DoD 3000.09, supra note 3 at 14. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Human Rights Watch, supra note 2 at 2.  
12 Krishnan, supra note 5 at 35.  
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other words, the distinction is between “weapons that augment our soldiers and those 
that can become soldiers.”13  
Currently, the dominant view is that robots will be used only to augment and ex-
tend our soldiers’ involvement in war.14 In this context, AWS distance humans from 
combat. Instead of being a novel category of weapons, AWS are simply the latest tech-
nological advancement that began with the bow and arrow. Similarly, the critical 
responses to the potential introduction of AWS are not novel. Some see any introduc-
tion of new weapons as unethical or illegal.15 
However, the idea that AWS will replace our soldiers is gaining traction. AWS are 
more than an extension of human combat when they can make decisions to kill without 
human involvement.16 While the use of drones may be criticized for other reasons, their 
capability of adhering to the principles of IHL is uncontroversial because humans are 
involved in the targeting process. AWS would take human operators out of the deci-
sion-making loop.17 Distancing humans from war through technology has been a 
common theme of weapons development, but taking humans out of the loop complete-
ly is a fundamental shift in the development of weapons systems.  
The Future of AWS 
Although AWS are not yet a reality on the battlefield, the level of autonomy in 
weapons has been growing steadily and there are several weapons systems approaching 
fully autonomous capabilities.18 Experts believe that their introduction is inevitable and 
imminent.19 The former chief scientist of the US Air Force contends that the technolo-
gy required for “fully autonomous military strikes” already exists.20  
The development of AWS will take place incrementally, beginning with aspects of 
operations such as take off and navigation, leading to full autonomy over time.21 As 
technological advances are made, increasingly sophisticated sensing and computational 
systems will be implemented. The increased tempo of warfare and pressures to mini-
mize a state’s own military casualties will also create a demand for AWS.22  
Several weapons systems already include semi-autonomous capabilities and the  
level of automation in weapons systems is steadily increasing. The South Korean mili-
tary recently deployed a stationary sentry robot in the Korean Demilitarized Zone that is 
capable of detecting and selecting targets. It can respond with lethal or non-lethal force, 
depending on the circumstances. According to the developer, “the ultimate decision 
                                                                                                                                            
13 Major David F Bigelow, “Fast forward to the robot dilemma” Armed Forces Journal (1 November 2007), 
online: <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com>. 
14 Krishnan, supra note 5 at 35. 
15 Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, “Law and Ethics for Robot Soldiers” (2012) 176 Policy Review 35 
at 39-40. 
16 Krishnan, supra note 5 at 33.  
17 Markus Wagner, “Taking Humans Out of the Loop: Implications for International Humanitarian Law” 
(2011) 21 Journal of Law, Information & Science155 at 157-8. 
18 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 2. See also Timothy Coughlin “The Future of Robotic Weaponry and 
the Law of Armed Conflict: Irreconcilable Differences?” (2011) 17 UCL Jurisprudence Review 67. 
19 See especially Gary E Marchant et al, “International Governance of Autonomous Military Robots”, online: 
(2011) 12 Colum Sci & Tech L Rev 272 <http://www.stlr.org>. 
20 Werner JA Dahm, “Killer Drones Are Science Fiction”, The Wall Street Journal (15 February 2012) 11. 
21 Sharkey, “Automating Warfare”, supra note 7 at 141. 
22 Anderson & Waxman, supra note 15 at 36. 
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about shooting should be made by a human, not the robot.”23 However, the robot is 
capable of making that decision without human input.24  
The Phalanx Close In Weapons Systems for Aegis class cruisers in the US Navy is 
currently “capable of autonomously performing its own search, detect, evaluation, track 
and kill assessment functions.”25 The system has four modes: semi-automatic, where 
humans control the firing decision; automatic special, where humans set targets but the 
software determines how to carry them out; automatic, where humans monitor the 
system but it works without their input; and casualty, where the system does whatever is 
necessary to save the ship.26  
The United Kingdom is currently testing a new semi-autonomous aircraft, Taranis. 
The designer, BAE Systems, describes it as “an autonomous and stealthy unmanned 
aircraft.”27 Although humans will remain in the loop for the time being, it may be capa-
ble of autonomous flight.28 The United States of America (US) is also developing a 
semi-autonomous drone, the X-47B, which will be able to take off and land without 
human input. The developer contends that it is a system that “takes off, flies a pre-
programmed mission, and then returns to base in response to mouse clicks from its 
mission operator. The mission operator monitors the…vehicle’s operation, but does not 
actively ‘fly’ it via remote control as is the case for other unmanned systems currently in 
operation.”29 The current development of X-47B does not envision autonomous target 
selection.  
The development of AWS has been included in all roadmaps of the US forces since 
2004.30 The US Air Force’s Flight Plan suggests that fully autonomous flight systems 
will be possible as early as 2025.31 Sharkey claims to have read valid robotics develop-
ment reports from over 50 countries that are currently developing autonomous 
weapons systems, including Canada.32 US Air Force Major Michael A. Guetlin states 
that “[it] is not a matter of ‘will’ we employ [autonomous weapons]; it is a matter of 
‘when’ we employ them.”33  
                                                                                                                                            
23 Jean Kumagai, “A Robotic Sentry for Korea’s Demilitarized Zone” IEEE Spectrum (1 March 2007), online: 
IEEE Spectrum <http://www.spectrum.ieee.org>. 
24 Although the robot is capable of selecting and engaging targets without human input, its location in the 
DMZ makes it unnecessary for the robot to distinguish between civilian and enemy combatant. Any person 
that crosses a pre-determined line is considered an enemy combatant by the robot.  
25 United States Navy, Fact File: MK 15 – Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), (19 Oct 2012), online: 
<http://www.navy.mil>. 
26 Marchant, supra note 19 at 287. 
27 BAE Systems, Taranis, online: BAE Systems <http://www.baesystems.com>. 
28 Human Rights Watch, supra note 2 at 17-18. 
29 Northrop Grumman, “Unmanned Combat Air System Carrier Demonstration” at 2, online: Northrup 
Grumman Corporation <http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/X47BUCAS/Documents/X-
47B_Navy_UCAS_FactSheet.pdf>. 
30 Noel Sharkey, “The Automation and Proliferation of Military Drones and the Protection of Civilians” 
(2011) 3(2) Law, Innovation and Technology 229 at 235 [Sharkey, “Automation and Proliferation”].  
31 United States Air Force, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047 (18 May 2009) at 50, online: 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uas_2009.pdf>. 
32 Sharkey, “Automation and Proliferation”, supra note 30 at 231.  
33 Major Michael A Guetlin, Lethal Autonomous Weapons – Ethical and Doctrinal Implications, (JMO Department, 
Naval War College, 2005) [unpublished] at 18, online: Defence Technical Information Center 
<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA464896>. 
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The Perceived Benefits of AWS 
Gordon Johnson, a member of the now-defunct Pentagon Joint Forces Command 
emphasized the benefits of AWS: “They don’t get hungry. They’re not afraid. They 
don’t forget orders. They don’t care if the guy next to them has just been shot. Will they 
do a better job than humans? Yes.”34 
There are a number of tactical and operational factors that promote the develop-
ment of lethal AWS.35 AWS are cheaper to operate than human operated weapons and 
are capable of operating continuously, without the need for rest.36 Although it can be 
possible to extend mission times for humans up to 72 hours with performance enhanc-
ers, eventually a human needs rest.37 AWS are capable of long-term performance as 
their batteries sustain them. As battery and recharging technology improves, the possi-
ble mission time for AWS will continue to grow.  
Fewer humans are needed for the operation of AWS.38 It may soon be possible for 
a single operator to manage a swarm of semi-autonomous drones or for a single human 
commander to assign mission parameters to AWS and monitor them from a safe dis-
tance. This distances the human warfighter and expands the battle space. It will be 
possible to conduct combat over a much larger area than before. 
AWS are also potentially capable of processing battlefield information faster and 
more efficiently than humans.39 AWS can be fitted with any variety of sensory technol-
ogies, including: infrared vision, sonar, high definition cameras and sophisticated 
auditory sensors. This would give AWS an advantage over human sensory capabilities.  
One weakness of current remotely piloted vehicles is the possibility that the enemy 
will interfere with their satellite or radio links.40 AWS alleviates this concern, as they will 
be capable of operating without continuous contact with home base. Remotely piloted 
systems currently have a delay time of approximately 1.5 seconds, limiting their effec-
tiveness in a higher tempo battle space. This delay would make it impossible for a 
remotely piloted system to engage in an aerial dogfight, while autonomous flight capa-
bilities would make this possible. 
Proponents of AWS suggest that AWS may in fact be more capable of adhering to 
the principles of IHL than human soldiers.41 They may be able to act more conserva-
tively because they will not have a need for self-preservation. Robotic sensors will be 
better equipped to make battlefield observations than humans. AWS lack the emotions 
that can cloud a human’s judgment. They will be immune to the psychological problem 
of scenario fulfillment, the phenomenon of humans using new information to fit a 
pre-existing belief pattern.  
The introduction of AWS into the battlefield is inevitable, but it will be incremen-
tal. Although humans will be in the loop as a fail-safe when AWS are first deployed, 
their involvement will diminish over time. As human involvement diminishes, the diffi-
                                                                                                                                            
34 Tim Weiner, “‘GI Robot’ Rolls Toward the Battlefield” New York Times (1 February 2005), online: New 
York Times <http://www.nytimes.com>.  
35 Marchant, supra note 19 at 275. 
36 Guetlin, supra note 33 at 2. 
37 Krishnan, supra note 5 at 41. 
38 Marchant, supra note 19 at 275. 
39 Guetlin, supra note 33 at 4-5.  
40 Noel Sharkey, “Saying No! to Lethal Autonomous Targeting” (2010) 9:4 Journal of Military Ethics 369 at 
377 [Sharkey, “Saying No”].  
41 See especially Marchant, supra note 19 at 279-280. 
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culties faced by AWS in adhering to the principles of IHL will become more and more 
significant, requiring a thorough legal analysis.  
II. THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
(THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT) 
Warfare is governed by IHL, also known as the Law of Armed Conflict.42 IHL is 
relevant to the legality of weapons in two ways. First, a weapon may be incapable of 
adhering to the principles of IHL, rendering it illegal per se; even when it is deployed 
against a lawful target, the weapon will be illegal. Second, the weapon can be used in a 
way that is unlawful.43 For example, a rifle is a lawful weapon, but its use is unlawful if 
used to shoot civilians.  
Some analyses of AWS have conflated the two methods by which they could  
potentially be rendered illegal. Human Rights Watch’s paper, Losing Humanity, does not 
mention this distinction and has been criticized for oversimplifying the application of 
IHL.44 It is important to be clear about how AWS may violate the principles of IHL so 
that concerns can be adequately addressed. It is equally important to avoid overempha-
sizing the failure to address the differences between illegality per se and illegality by use. 
Doing so risks undervaluing what is really at issue: the possibility that AWS will be 
incapable of adhering to cardinal principles of IHL in some, if not all, circumstances.  
Illegal per se 
A weapon will be illegal per se if it causes superfluous injury or unnecessary suffer-
ing or is wholly incapable of adhering to the principles of IHL.45 This restriction is very 
limited because most weapons will be capable of adhering to IHL principles in specific 
circumstances. 
For example, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in an advisory opinion con-
sidered whether the use of nuclear weapons was illegal per se.46 The court concluded that 
nuclear weapons were not inherently incapable of distinction or proportionality, nor 
would they cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering in all circumstances, and 
so were not illegal per se.47 If nuclear weapons, which are among the most deadly, are not 
illegal per se, then it is highly unlikely that AWS would be. 
                                                                                                                                            
42 Gary D Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War (New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2012) at 2.  
43 Michael N Schmitt, “Autonomous Weapons Systems and International Humanitarian Law: A Reply to 
Critics” Harvard National Security Journal Features (5 February 2013) at 3 online: Harvard National Security 
Journal <http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Schmitt-Autonomous-Weapon-Systems-and-
IHL-Final.pdf>. 
44 Ibid at 8.  
45 See William Boothby, Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 
ch 5. 
46 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Rep 226, [Nuclear Weapons Adviso-
ry Opinion]. 
47 Meredith Hagger & Tim McCormack, “Regulating the Use of Unmanned Combat Vehicles: Are General 
Principles of IHL Sufficient?” (2011) 21 Journal of Law, Information and Science 74 at 81-84.  
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Illegal by use 
This paper will focus on the second method by which a weapons system could be 
illegal: if the principles of IHL are violated through its use. It is important to recognize 
that if AWS violated the principles of IHL in certain situations, only their use in those 
situations would be illegal, not the use of AWS altogether.  
There are four core IHL principles that apply to every combat operation: distinc-
tion, proportionality, military necessity and unnecessary suffering.48 This paper will only 
address distinction and proportionality. While the use of AWS engages the principles of 
military necessity and unnecessary suffering, these principles are engaged in a different 
way than distinction and proportionality. The difficulties of adherence to the principles 
of distinction and proportionality naturally arise when humans are removed from the 
decision-making loop. The principles of military necessity and unnecessary suffering are 
less affected by the removal of a human from the loop and more situation-specific.  
The Principle of Distinction 
There are two components to the principle of distinction (sometimes referred to as 
discrimination): combatants must be able to distinguish (i) between civilians and enemy 
combatants, and (ii) between civilian and military objects.49 This principle is codified in 
Article 48 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention: 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and 
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish be-
tween the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects 
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only 
against military objectives.50 
For states that are not signatories to Additional Protocol I, the principle applies as 
customary international law.51 The Commentary on the Additional Protocols, produced by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), holds that Article 48 of Additional 
Protocol I reflects the foundational principle of the laws and customs of war that civil-
ians must be protected and therefore must be distinguished from combatants.52 In 
addition, in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the ICJ held that the rule against indis-
criminate attacks is a “cardinal” principle of IHL.53  
The prohibition on indiscriminate attacks is particularly concerned with the attack-
er’s doubt. Where there is sufficient doubt, a target will be presumptively immune from 
attack.54 This is codified in Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I55 and has also been 
                                                                                                                                            
48 Solis, supra note 42 at 250.  
49 Ibid at 251.  
50 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, art 48, (entered into force 7 December 1979) [Additional 
Protocol I].  
51 Solis, supra note 42 at 251.  
52 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann, eds, ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols 
of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), at 598. 
53 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 46 at 78. 
54 Schmitt, supra note 43 at 16.  
55 Additional Protocol I, supra note 50, art 50(1).  
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accepted as customary international law.56 Although some level of doubt is permissible, 
the presumption will be created in situations that cause “a reasonable attacker in the 
same or similar circumstances to hesitate before attacking,”57 
Adherence to the principle of distinction has become increasingly difficult, as mili-
tary operations have evolved from state against state warfare to counterinsurgency 
operations.58 However, the challenges of applying the principle of distinction do not 
change the core of the principle; namely, parties to a conflict must distinguish between 
civilian targets and military targets.  
The Principle of Proportionality 
The principles of IHL strive to protect civilian populations, but there is no way to 
eliminate civilian death and injury from war altogether. Proportionality seeks to address 
the protection of civilians directly and mandates that where collateral damage to civil-
ians occurs, it must be proportional to military advantage.59 The rule of proportionality 
is defined in Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I. It states that a violation of pro-
portionality will be “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage antici-
pated.”60 The ICRC’s study of customary IHL restated the principle in these terms:  
[The] armed forces and their installations are objectives that may be attacked 
wherever they are, except when the attack could incidentally result in loss of 
human life among the civilian population, injuries to civilians, and damage to 
civilian objects which would be excessive in relation to the expected direct 
and specific military advantage.61  
There is no reference to proportionality in Additional Protocol II, which applies to 
intranational armed conflicts.62 However, the ICRC argues that because proportionality 
is inherent to the principle of humanity, which is included in the Protocol’s preamble, it 
must be included in the Protocol’s application. In addition, the ICRC could find no 
official practice contrary to the principle of proportionality in either international or 
intranational armed conflicts, arguing that the principle has crystallized into customary 
law.63  
 “Military advantage” has been interpreted by many states, including Canada and 
the US, to include the particular advantage anticipated from an attack, as well as the 
advantage anticipated to the military operation as a whole.64 The military advantage 
                                                                                                                                            
56 See Sandoz, Swinarski & Zimmerman, supra note 52, at 1410-1439.  
57 Schmitt, supra note 43 at 16. 
58 Solis, supra note 42 at 254.  
59 Ibid at 274. 
60 Additional Protocol I, supra note 50, art 51(5)(b). 
61 Sandoz, Swinarski & Zimmerman, supra note 52 at 620-1.  
62 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 December 1978).  
63 Jean-Marie Henckaerts et al, eds, Customary International Humanitarian Law, vol 1, ICRC (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2005) at 48. 
64 Ibid at 49. 
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must be “concrete and direct.” According to the Commentary on the Additional Protocols, 
the phrase “concrete and direct” indicates that the advantage “must be substantial and 
relatively close, and that advantages which are hardly perceptible and those which would 
only appear in the long term should be disregarded.”65 Canada’s Law of Armed Conflict 
Manual states that a “concrete and direct” advantage will exist where “the commander 
has an honest and reasonable expectation that the attack will make a relevant contribu-
tion to the success of the overall operation.”66 
Proportionality requires a contextual weighing of two factors: the possibility of 
harm to civilians and civilian objects and the potential military advantage of the attack. 
Potential harm to civilians is more readily capable of objective determination. Com-
manders already use collateral damage simulators to ensure attacks are proportional.67 
The determination of military advantage, on the other hand, is more contextual and 
discretionary. In determining whether the military advantage requirement has been met, 
one asks if a ‘reasonable commander’ would arrive at a similar conclusion. The evalua-
tion of military advantage on the basis of the reasonable commander allows for 
operational discretion. The contextual and discretionary nature of proportionality is 
what causes concerns that AWS may be incapable of adhering to the principle. 
Although distinction and proportionality are distinct concepts of IHL, they are  
intertwined. Distinction requires combatants to distinguish between enemy combatants 
and civilians. So, a combatant cannot intend to harm civilians, but proportionality ena-
bles them to attack knowing that some civilians will be harmed.68 This is important to 
keep in mind when considering the challenges AWS faces in complying with IHL. If 
AWS are incapable of distinction, they will also be incapable of proportionality.  
III. CHALLENGES OF COMPLIANCE WITH IHL 
Generally, technological advances in warfare have outpaced the development of 
IHL. This phenomenon is not unique to IHL, but common wherever legal regimes  
interact with technological advancements.69 For AWS to be used legally, they must be 
capable of adhering to the principles of IHL, including distinction and proportionality. 
Compliance with the Principle of Distinction 
On its face, the principle of distinction can be seen as an objective requirement. 
AWS must be able to objectively assess whether a potential target is a civilian target or a 
military target.70 The distinction looks like a black and white rule; either a target is or is 
not a military target. However, difficulties arise because a target can be classified as both 
a civilian and military target depending on the context.  
                                                                                                                                            
65 Sandoz, Swinarski & Zimmerman, supra note 52 at 2209. 
66 Canada, Office of the Judge Advocate General, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, 
2001, s 415(2), online: Office of the Judge Advocate General <http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag>.  
67 Schmitt, supra note 43 at 19-20.  
68 Solis, supra note 42 at 276. 
69 Wagner, supra note 17 at 157.  
70 Ibid at 159.  
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In Killer Robots, Armin Krishnan identifies three main concerns regarding the ability 
of AWS to distinguish legal targets from civilian targets: (i) AWS may be susceptible to 
“weak machine perception;” (ii) AWS may have difficulties in interacting with their  
environment, leading to the “frame problem;” and (iii) there may be a problem of “weak 
software.”71 
Weak Machine Perception 
Distinction requires an evaluation based on sensory input. Current technology is 
only beginning to approach the ability to distinguish between human and non-human 
objects, never mind between civilians and combatants.72 This suggests that while it may 
be technically possible for AWS to be capable of distinction, it will take some time  
before the capability to distinguish is a reality.  
This problem is compounded in intranational armed conflicts with non-uniformed 
enemy combatants. In such situations, a target is only lawful if it is directly engaged in 
hostile activity or intends to engage in hostile activity. An AWS targeting decision would 
have to be based on situational awareness and an understanding of human intention.73 
Non-uniformed (and consequently unlawful) combatants in an armed conflict are iden-
tified by their engagement or intention to engage in hostilities.74 One solution to this 
problem would be to only allow AWS to fire when they have been fired upon. Another 
would be to limit the use of AWS to situations where the declared hostile force is easily 
recognizable.75 A third way to ensure AWS adhere to the principle of distinction would 
be to limit the number of potential targets to a fixed list of lawful targets.76  
Even if AWS are wholly incapable of distinguishing between civilians and combat-
ants, it would be possible to use them against these lawful targets in a battle space that 
does not contain civilians or civilian objects.77 This approach is technically correct, but 
may be unrealistic given the trend of warfare towards counterinsurgency operations in 
or near civilian spaces. As a result, limiting the use of AWS to battle spaces void of 
civilians would render AWS unfit for use in almost all circumstances. Given the per-
ceived benefits of AWS, it is unlikely that this limitation would be adopted by any state.  
John Canning, a Combat Systems Engineer for the Unmanned Systems Integration 
Branch at the US Naval Surface Warfare Center, has proposed a possible solution to 
some of the issues raised by AWS. In his proposal, AWS would target the weapon,  
rather than the human holding the weapon, so any injury to the human would be con-
sidered collateral damage.78Although theoretically possible, this solution does not 
adequately address the possibility of indiscriminate attacks. Distinguishing between a 
                                                                                                                                            
71 Krishnan, supra note 5 at 98-99. 
72 Sharkey, “Automating Warfare”, supra note 7 at 143-144.  
73 Sharkey, “Saying No”, supra note 40 at 379.  
74 Solis, supra note 42 at 254-255. Combatants are under a duty to distinguish themselves from civilians. Art 
44.3 of Additional Protocol I requires it. Terrorist organizations do not typically distinguish themselves, 
making distinction in modern warfare more difficult than it has been in traditional warfare.  
75 Major Jeffrey S Thurnher, “No One at the Controls: Legal Implications of Fully Autonomous Targeting” 
(2012) 67:4 Joint Forces Quarterly 77 at 83. 
76 Anderson & Waxman, supra note 15 at 41. 
77 Schmitt, supra note 43 at 11. 
78 John S Canning, “A Concept of Operations for Armed Autonomous Systems” (2006), online: Defense 
Technical Information Center <http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2006disruptive_tech/canning.pdf>.  
58 AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS Vol. 23 
!
weapon and any other object may be just as difficult as distinguishing between a civilian 
and an enemy combatant.79 The potential problems with this solution are illustrated 
with a simple example. If enemy combatants force children or other civilians into trans-
porting weapons for them, they would not be legal targets. However, under Canning’s 
proposal, they would be treated as collateral damage.  
Frame Problem 
In a complex and fast-paced modern battle space, AWS will have difficulty inter-
preting all the information needed to correctly assess the situation. Processing all of the 
possible scenarios would take an excessive amount of time. Consequently, AWS will 
have to be programmed to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information. In 
an open environment, programming this type of distinction could lead to situations 
where the information is incorrectly interpreted, causing an indiscriminate attack.  
According to Armin Krishnan, this means AWS would be too slow to be militarily  
effective, or else would be prone to indiscriminate use because the systems “would  
often miss important details or incorrectly interpret situations.”80 
The frame problem is complicated by the rule that an attack will be unlawful where 
the legitimacy of the target is in significant doubt. Any doubt about the legitimacy of a 
target does not create a presumption that the target is unlawful: instead, the doubt must 
cause “a reasonable attacker in the same or similar circumstances to hesitate before  
attacking.”81 The threshold is framed in terms of human reasonableness, which compli-
cates its adoption in AWS. This determination is contextual and would require different 
“doubt thresholds” depending on the circumstances. Michael Schmitt suggests that as 
long as human operators do not program the “doubt thresholds” unreasonably high (so 
that the AWS is more likely to attack), AWS will not violate the principles of distinc-
tion.82 
Weak Software 
As software becomes more complicated, it becomes less predictable. No one pro-
grammer understands or knows the entire piece of software, so interactions within it 
become unpredictable as well.83 Combined with an open environment, this could lead to 
situations where AWS apply force indiscriminately because of an unanticipated software 
error. 
In 1997, Murray Campbell and Feng-hsiung Hsu created Deep Blue, a chess playing 
computer that eventually beat top rated chess player Garry Kasparov. The difficulties 
faced by Campbell and Hsu while programming Deep Blue exemplify the weak software 
problems faced by programming AWS. At a certain point, the computer became a more 
capable chess player than they were, making it increasingly difficult to tell if a move was 
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a bug or good tactics.84 The same difficulty will be faced when programming AWS: at a 
certain point it will become difficult to tell if the machine is making an error or if it is 
seeing something that a human cannot. 
Sharkey argues that AWS will not be able to discriminate between combatants and 
civilians. Although it is technically possible to program AWS to avoid civilian targets, 
this is only achievable if there is a clear definition of “civilian.”85 In non-international 
armed conflict this definition becomes less and less clear. Imagine a situation where 
terrorists are forcing occupants of a village to transport weapons. The villagers are car-
rying weapons and could be considered by AWS as participating in a hostile act as 
enemy combatants. However, more subjective factors, like body language that indicates 
the villagers are transporting the weapons against their will, may be missed by AWS. 
Consequently, AWS may have difficulty in correctly assessing the situation and avoiding 
unnecessary civilian death.  
Although the principle of distinction appears to be an objective requirement, its 
subjective elements create challenges for the use of AWS. First, the sensory technology 
must develop sufficiently so that AWS have enough information to be capable of dis-
tinguishing between civilian and military targets. Second, that information must be 
processed efficiently and accurately, so that mistakes are not made and the AWS target 
indiscriminately. Both of these steps require technology that does not yet exist. It is 
conceivable that the technology required to distinguish will be developed, but the chal-
lenges raised by removing humans from the targeting decision cannot be ignored simply 
because the technology may exist someday.  
Compliance with the Principle of Proportionality 
It is difficult to establish black and white rules with respect to proportionality.86 A 
report described this problem to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia: “[one] cannot easily assess the value of innocent human lives as opposed to 
capturing a military objective.”87 Adherence to the principle of proportionality also  
requires a subjective assessment. It is difficult to apply in practice and requires a weigh-
ing of potentially competing interests: military advantage and the protection of 
civilians.88 This weighing of interests is only possible on a case-by-case basis: different 
circumstances require different responses.  
The evaluation of proportionality requires relative weight be placed on competing 
interests. In order to analyze a situation and deliver a proportional response, AWS face 
several challenges. They must be able to anticipate the effect of all potential decisions 
and how many civilian casualties could result. They would also have to react to changing 
circumstances.89 Then they must calculate the military advantage and determine whether 
the collateral damage is acceptable.  
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According to William Boothby, the proportionality rule has no direct application to 
weapons development because of the requirement for case-by-case determination.90 
However, unlike other weapons, AWS could replace the human decision maker. While 
humans may be capable of balancing complex interests, the same cannot be said for 
AWS. Therefore, proportionality must be considered in questioning the legality of AWS.  
Collateral Damage 
Systems that determine the likelihood of collateral damage already exist and are 
used to determine what level of command is required to authorize an attack. A com-
mander weighs the potential collateral damage against military advantage.91 The same 
frame problem exists when AWS operate in open and unstructured environments. To 
calculate the collateral damage of an attack, AWS will either have to calculate the conse-
quences of every possible action (taking an excessive amount of time) or make 
assumptions that could potentially lead to a disproportionate attack. Determinations of 
collateral damage will always involve assumptions; certainty is almost never possible in 
armed conflict. If AWS are employed in open civilian environments, the information 
relied upon to support assumptions in a collateral damage determination must be col-
lected and processed adequately.  
Military Advantage 
Currently, no system is capable of calculating military advantage, but proponents 
suggest that it is theoretically possible.92 The frame problem complicates any determina-
tion of military advantage because the decision maker would need to consider the 
immediate and long-term consequences of an action. This ability has yet to be replicated 
by software. Since AWS do not have an infinite amount of time to make these calcula-
tions, some shortcuts will have to be programmed into the software, potentially leading 
to errors and disproportionate attacks.  
Military advantage and collateral damage are constantly shifting and depend on the 
context. An example illustrates the potential challenges faced by AWS: if an enemy 
combatant is setting up a defensive position on top of a building, there will be a military 
advantage in targeting that combatant. If there are no civilians in the area, the probabil-
ity of collateral damage will be sufficiently low and the attack will be proportional. 
However, if a large group of civilians runs into the building, the potential for collateral 
damage becomes unacceptable and the attack will not be proportional. What would be 
immediately obvious to a human soldier requires complex processing and sensing capa-
bilities, as well as an algorithm that is capable of making speedy and correct 
determinations of proportionality.  
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Balancing the Two: The Reasonable Commander 
Marcus Wagner has suggested the challenges faced in programming AWS may ren-
der their use “almost useless except in the narrowest of circumstances.”93 If they cannot 
be programmed to meet the reasonable commander requirement (i.e. to balance the 
potential for collateral damage with a calculation of military advantage), then they will 
never be capable of a proportional attack.  
Weighing collateral damage and military advantage requires the evaluation of a  
multitude of factors. A complete understanding of the risks associated with AWS may 
be impossible. The balancing of multiple factors would involve complex programming 
and it may not be possible to predict outcomes with any certainty.94 Complex software 
is written not by one programmer, but by hundreds. Unforeseen interactions of code 
may result in undesirable results, especially because AWS will be deployed in open and 
unstructured environments.  
Major A. Guetlin suggests that adhering to the principle of proportionality is really 
a question of probabilities: “If the probability of success is low, or the probability of 
excessive collateral damage is high, then the weapon system will not engage.”95 If AWS 
are operating in a civilian centre, the commander must set the threshold for engagement 
higher than if they were operating in a desert. Provided that the commander has pro-
grammed the AWS correctly, Major A. Guetlin argues that their use would be 
proportional.96 This would put control of proportionality back in the hands of a human. 
However, it ignores the challenges of predetermining collateral damage and the proba-
bilities of success accurately in advance of the mission and sidesteps the issue. While 
AWS operating under this probabilities approach may end up being more proportional, 
the underlying potential for disproportionality is not addressed.  
There is also a fundamental moral objection to AWS: taking the decision to kill 
away from a human and giving it to machines. Even a flawed human being is more 
capable of moral action than a robot without a conscience.97 AWS would have no 
awareness beyond their own internal processes and would have no concept of the finali-
ty of life.98 Due to this inherent limitation, AWS would be incapable of acting 
proportionally. Even if collateral damage and military advantage are capable of numeri-
cal calculation, if AWS cannot comprehend the human consequences of its actions 
beyond numbers on a balance sheet, they will not be capable of meaningful compliance 
with the principle of proportionality.  
It is conceivable that AWS will one day be capable of distinction and proportionali-
ty in some circumstances. Proponents of AWS have argued that by limiting the battle 
spaces AWS participate in or their potential targets, compliance with the principle of 
distinction is possible. By programming doubt thresholds into AWS, they may also be 
capable of proportionality. However, the proposed operational solutions avoid address-
ing the legitimate challenges faced by the use of AWS in modern warfare by placing 
potentially unrealistic restrictions on their use. One only needs to look at the prevalence 
of unmanned drones to imagine the potential growth of AWS usage in war.  
                                                                                                                                            
93 Wagner, supra note 17 at 163.  
94 Marchant, supra note 19 at 284. 
95 Guetlin, supra note 33 at 11. 
96 Ibid at 12.  
97 Anderson & Waxman, supra note 15 at 42. 
98 Krishnan, supra note 5 at 132-133. 
62 AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS Vol. 23 
!
Additional Challenges 
The principles of distinction and proportionality do not operate in watertight com-
partments. There are additional challenges raised by the implementation of AWS that 
engage both principles: empirical skepticism in the value of AWS, the potential expan-
sion of the battle space, the risk of moral disengagement, and the concerns of damaging 
civilian relations.  
Empirical Skepticism 
Robotic technology may never reach the point of being able to adhere to the prin-
ciples of distinction or proportionality. The promise of ever-increasing capabilities of 
robotics that will “overcome human failings” is a slippery slope and may lead to the 
introduction of AWS before sufficient safeguards are in place.99 It would be unwise to 
count AWS out altogether; it is impossible to predict how technology will advance in 
the next 30 years. However, the possibility that adequate technology may never be de-
veloped must be considered.  
Expansion of the Battle Space 
If there is no risk to military personnel, then the human cost of going to war will be 
significantly lowered. This could lead to the expansion of participation in armed con-
flict.100 This objection is not unique to AWS; it has also be raised by critics of remotely 
piloted drones.101 However, remotely piloted drones require constant communication 
with their home base, whereas AWS can operate independently. Therefore, AWS may 
have an even larger impact on the expansion of military intervention than drones. 
Moral Disengagement 
The use of AWS may lead to moral disengagement due to the distancing of humans 
from battle. AWS mitigate two major obstacles faced by soldiers: “fear of being killed 
and resistance to killing.”102 Peter Singer interviewed pilots of unmanned aerial vehicles, 
more commonly known as drones, for his book, Wired for War. One unnamed pilot 
reportedly said: “The truth is, it isn’t all I thought it was cracked up to be. I mean, I 
thought killing somebody would be this life-changing experience. And then I did it, and 
I was like ‘All right, whatever…’”103 This young pilot’s experience with distanced  
killing exemplifies the problem of moral disengagement. When the human overseer 
does not even have control over the targeting decision, the moral disengagement will 
only deepen.  
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Civilian Relations 
If it is possible for AWS to distinguish between civilians and combatants more ca-
pably than a human, then humans may be perceived as less capable. This can lead to 
distrust and anxiety amongst civilian populations, which could endanger the long-term 
success of the mission.104 It is also likely that civilian populations will perceive AWS as 
being less proportional than humans, compounding the problem.  
The potential use of AWS raises challenges of compliance with the principles of 
distinction and proportionality. The technology may never be capable of meeting stand-
ards that are designed for humans. Distinguishing between civilian and enemy 
combatants requires computational processing power that has not yet been achieved. 
Even if the technology is developed, the definition of civilian may not be sufficiently 
precise for the purposes of software. The subjective and contextual nature of propor-
tionality requires a weighing of factors that may not be possible for a machine. In 
addition, there is a moral objection to AWS: the decision to kill a human should not be 
given to a robot.  
It has been argued that, by evaluating the challenges of strictly complying with IHL 
principles, AWS are held to a higher standard than humans.105 History is full of exam-
ples of indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks committed by human soldiers. 
However, this argument is deficient for two reasons. First, the concerns raised in this 
paper demonstrate that AWS have a long way to go before they are capable of ap-
proaching human-like decision-making. If AWS are not required to be better than a 
human at distinguishing and calculating proportionality, they must at least reach the 
same level. Second, it ignores the perceived benefits of the introduction of AWS relied 
upon by proponents of the systems. If AWS are developed in part as a humane devel-
opment in the exercise of war, they should be held to a higher standard than humans, as 
they must be more precise and proportional. Only then is the laudable goal of reducing 
the destruction of war while maintaining military advantage achievable. 
IV. POTENTIAL LEGAL RESPONSES TO AWS 
Historical reality suggests that if a new weapon has substantial advantages for one 
state, it will be gradually adopted by other states over time.106 Given the potential ad-
vantages of AWS, it is likely that their use will proliferate in the next 30 years. Although 
there are serious concerns that must be addressed regarding the adherence to distinction 
and proportionality principles, it is possible that they could be overcome.  
In Killer Robots, Armin Krishnan argues that the development of AWS can lead to 
either the humanizing of war or to a more dangerous battle environment. What path 
AWS follow “will largely depend on an effective regulation…”107 If technology devel-
ops to the point where AWS are capable of distinction and proportionality in some 
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circumstances, they will not be illegal per se. However, they may be illegal in their use. 
How should the concerns surrounding AWS be addressed so that they will only be used 
in compliance with the principles of IHL? 
Are the Principles of IHL Sufficient? 
Michael Schmitt, chairman of the International Law Department of the US Naval 
War College, suggests that if AWS are not capable of meeting the legal standards of 
IHL, then they would already be unlawful.108 However, the mere applicability of IHL 
principles and attendant criminal liability for breaches thereof may not be sufficient to 
ensure that AWS are used lawfully.  
This fear is not limited to AWS. Many states expressed concern when the principles 
of IHL were insufficient to protect civilians from the widespread use of anti-personal 
landmines and cluster munitions.109 Like AWS, anti-personal landmines and cluster 
munitions are capable of lawful use, but in reality they were seldom used in conformity 
to the principles of IHL. States responded to the challenges raised by anti-personal 
landmines and cluster munitions through multilateral conventions rather than relying 
solely on the principles of IHL.110 It remains to be seen whether AWS will be as harm-
ful to civilian populations as anti-personal landmines and cluster munitions have proven 
to be. Instead of waiting until the full ramifications of AWS are known, a proactive legal 
framework for their use should be developed. 
Operational Solutions 
Two operational solutions merit further discussion: (i) keeping humans in the loop 
to comply with IHL principles, and (ii) programming AWS in such a way as to avoid 
any potential violations of IHL. 
Keeping humans in the loop 
If humans were in the targeting decision loop, AWS would presumably be capable 
of adhering to the principles of IHL. For example, DoD Directive 3000.09 stipulates 
that “autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow 
commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the 
use of the force.”111 However, this policy does not ensure that AWS will comply with 
IHL principles in the future.  
Currently, the benefits of removing humans from the loop are minimal: the tech-
nology is not sophisticated enough to replace a human decision maker in most 
circumstances. As technology improves, the benefits of removing humans will grow. 
Those benefits include less expense, lower reliance on communication networks, and 
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faster response times. Ensuring that humans stay in the loop would give AWS the ability 
to adhere to IHL principles, but it is not realistic as a permanent solution because states 
will be under pressure to lower operational costs and gain the competitive advantage by 
taking humans out of the equation. 
Arkin’s Ethical Governor  
Arkin suggests it will be possible to embed ethics in AWS so as to ensure their 
compliance with IHL principles. By constraining the range of possible actions available 
to AWS through an “ethical governor” and “ethical behavioural control,” Arkin con-
tends that AWS will not only be capable of adhering to IHL, but that they will also be 
able to exceed human capabilities.112 
Arkin’s attempts to translate IHL principles into a logical and programmable struc-
ture offer practical solutions to some issues raised by AWS, but there are problems with 
this approach. Arkin’s ethical governor assumes that “effective situational assessment 
methods exist” to ensure that AWS would not commit a lethal mistake.113 As demon-
strated above, this assumption may not be appropriate. In addition, an ethical governor 
may only be implementable in larger systems because of the requirement to read and 
assess a complex environment.114  
Keeping humans in the loop and implementing an ethical governor are practical so-
lutions to the immediate challenges raised by the use of AWS. However, they do not 
address the fundamental concern raised by AWS: whether IHL principles can ensure 
that AWS are used legally.  
Proposed legal solutions 
Outright Ban 
Human Rights Watch has proposed a blanket ban on autonomous robots, similar 
to anti-personal landmines. The plan would simply prohibit any use of lethal force by 
AWS without human input or supervision.115 If adopted, the ban would effectively 
ensure that AWS adhere to the principles of IHL. 
In contrast, if the potential advantages of AWS are realized, an outright ban may 
actually undermine the principles of IHL. Assuming that AWS are better able to distin-
guish and act proportionally than humans, banning these weapons would increase the 
risks to civilians.116 
Proponents of AWS argue that the mere possibility that they could be used illegally 
“is not a valid basis for imposing an across-the-board pre-emptive ban on the sys-
tems.”117 An outright ban might realistically be a step too far, but its proposal does 
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enhance the discourse and promotes a serious consideration of the issues faced by im-
plementing AWS.  
Multilateral Conventions 
There are many examples of new weapons technologies giving rise to multilateral 
conventions that restrain their use or development: biological weapons,118 chemical 
weapons,119 blinding lasers,120 and landmines.121 These conventions employ a wide range 
of approaches to regulating the use of weapons. For example, the Biological Weapons 
Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits all state-parties from acquir-
ing, developing, producing, stockpiling, or retaining biological or chemical weapons.122 
In contrast, Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons prohibits the use of permanently 
blinding laser weapons, but not their research or development.123 
Multilateral conventions have been successful in regulating these weapons because 
their use is widely recognized as contrary to the principles of IHL. The same cannot be 
said for AWS: there is still reasonable debate as to whether AWS will be capable of 
adhering to the principles of IHL. It has been suggested that a multilateral treaty that 
bans or limits the use of AWS is impractical. Consensus would be impossible to reach 
and compliance would not be guaranteed.124  
The annual meeting of state parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons (CCW) in November 2013 raised the topic of AWS. The state parties decided 
to establish an “informal Meeting of Experts” to “discuss the questions related to 
emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems….”125 The 
establishment of the four-day informal meeting was supported by the majority of state 
parties, including the US.126 The proposal is a welcome recognition of the need to de-
velop international standards and state commitments regarding the use of AWS. It 
remains to be seen whether CCW is the appropriate international convention to regulate 
the development and use of AWS because the weapons currently regulated under CCW, 
including blinding lasers and landmines, do not raise the same fundamental concerns.  
Further development of AWS is necessary before a multilateral convention would 
be a viable option to regulate their use. However, waiting until the technology exists 
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before implementing standards is not desirable. Guidelines and dialogue are essential 
during the development stage to ensure that AWS are engineered in a way that complies 
with IHL standards.  
The Current Approach: The Obligation to Review and Codes of Conduct 
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I places each member state “under an obligation 
to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibit-
ed by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law…”127 Although the US is 
not a signatory to this Protocol, it has been suggested that they are obligated to review 
weapons and ensure that they are capable of complying with the principles of IHL.128  
It is current US policy to review weapons systems. The Department of Defense has 
prescribed that “the acquisition and procurement of DoD weapons and weapon sys-
tems shall be consistent with all applicable domestic law and treaties and international 
agreements…, customary international law, and the law of armed conflict…”129 It has 
been proposed that this is enough to ensure AWS are used legally.130  
The states engaged in the development of AWS, particularly the US, have an inher-
ent interest in regulating AWS. Anderson and Waxman argue the US must develop a set 
of principles to regulate and govern AWS for the benefit of the international communi-
ty as a whole.131 There are multiple benefits to a code of conduct approach. Codes are 
more flexible than formal multilateral conventions, and are potentially more capable of 
adapting quickly to technological advances. They are relatively easy to create and adopt 
in comparison to multilateral conventions. However, there are disadvantages as well. 
Codes of conduct are not internationally binding and do not involve any international 
oversight.132 They do not offer long-term solutions, as more and more states become 
capable of developing and using AWS according to their own standards. 
In addition, the obligation to review can be circumvented. The US Predator drone 
was reviewed when it was only capable of surveillance and had not yet been weapon-
ized. Later, when it was equipped with Hellfire missiles, the US stated that they did not 
need to review the drone again, as both the drone and the missile had been reviewed 
separately.133 A similar approach to AWS would not constitute a full review of AWS and 
should be avoided.  
DoD Directive 3000.09 represents the current US Code of Conduct. It was re-
leased publicly, making it open to scrutiny and available for the benefit of the 
international community. Although it demonstrates American concern with the devel-
opment of AWS, it does not go far enough in planning the future development of AWS. 
It relies on keeping humans in the loop, which may ensure the legality of AWS in the 
short term, but the Directive fails to prepare for the possibility that humans will be 
removed when it is beneficial and technologically possible to do so.  
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DoD policy may change over time to reflect the development of AWS. When it be-
comes advantageous and technologically possible to take humans out of the loop, a new 
policy will be implemented to ensure compliance with the principles of IHL. This ap-
proach may result in internal safeguards, but it does not necessarily promote 
international discussion or ensure compliance with IHL unless the new policy is also 
publicized. One country may adopt strict policies, while others may not. Relying on 
state-created codes of conduct and their obligation to review will result in unilateral 
decision-making. This would stymie the development of internationally recognized 
principles necessary to ensure the safe operation of AWS globally. 
Framework Conventions 
A final possibility for the regulation of AWS would be adoption of a framework 
convention.134 This approach would combine the positive qualities of a multilateral 
convention and a more flexible ‘code of conduct’ approach. A minimalistic multilateral 
convention could be created that develops a process and institutional capacity to gradu-
ally develop a substantive legal regime. Examples of this type of convention include: the 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,135 the Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change136 and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.137  
A framework convention has several benefits. It acknowledges that a problem ex-
ists and draws the attention of experts and the public to the problem. It commits states 
to taking more substantive action in the future.138 Although it would not be a clearly 
defined regime from the start, it would allow for the identification of the precise issues 
that need addressing. It would not commit states to a binding agreement before the full 
capabilities of AWS are known. Instead, it would allow for open dialogue amongst 
states that are at various stages of developing AWS.  
A new framework convention is preferable to regulating the development of AWS 
under an existing convention, such as CCW. CCW currently regulates conventional 
weapons that have been used in combat and have had their capabilities of adherence to 
the principles of IHL examined over time. In contrast, AWS are undergoing rapid tech-
nological development and have not yet been deployed in military operations. The 
fundamental difficulty that AWS have in adhering to the principles of IHL must be 
addressed before they are operationalized, not after. As technology develops, the legal 
framework for AWS must be consistently and frequently re-examined. A framework 
convention can address the unique challenge raised by AWS: removing humans from 
warfare.  
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The Way Forward 
A legal framework to ensure the lawful use of AWS must be developed as soon as 
possible. Some proponents of AWS suggest that it is too early to know how the tech-
nology will develop and that lawmakers must wait until a fully autonomous system is in 
hand before the legal questions can be resolved.139 This view is not sustainable. AWS 
are not a technology of the distant future: their development is already underway. A 
legal framework should be created before the development of AWS advances to the 
point where their underlying architecture is difficult to change.  
In International Governance of Autonomous Military Robots, the authors suggest that there 
are four requirements for a successful legal regime.140 First, it must involve “clearly 
defined and articulated expectations” which identify precisely the problems that need to 
be addressed. Second, the solutions to those problems must be realistic and capable of 
actual implementation. Third, they must be “holistic and inclusive” and include all rele-
vant stakeholders in discussions. Fourth, they must be “subject to assessment” that 
allows for improvement over time.141 While codes of conduct offer some advantages, a 
framework convention is best suited to meeting these four criteria. A framework con-
vention can identify the precise problem of adherence to IHL that comes from 
removing humans from the loop. Its incremental approach allows for the realistic im-
plementation of international standards and periodic reassessment. A framework 
convention, in contrast to a state-by-state soft law approach, allows for the inclusion of 
all stakeholders.  
CONCLUSION 
Although AWS are not yet a reality, it is likely that they soon will be. The perceived 
benefits of AWS ensure that their development will continue. This development will 
occur incrementally towards full autonomy. At first, humans will remain in the loop. As 
the technology progresses, human interaction with AWS will likely decrease until hu-
mans are out of the loop altogether. The removal of humans from the decision-making 
loop leads to profound concerns that AWS will be incapable of adhering to the princi-
ples of IHL.  
This paper focused on two principles of IHL: distinction and proportionality. 
There are also concerns that AWS violate principles of command responsibility. This is 
an area that requires further consideration.142 The principles of distinction and propor-
tionality both seem to require subjective human reasoning, creating challenges for AWS 
compliance.  
The use of AWS in compliance with the principles of IHL will prove challenging. 
AWS will have to overcome issues of weak machine perception, the computational 
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challenges of an open environment, and the potential of weak software. Their judgment 
must also meet the standard of a reasonable commander. AWS must be programmed in 
such a way that they are capable of quickly performing complex situational calculations 
to at least the level of a human soldier. Additionally, there are concerns that the tech-
nology will never improve as well as proponents suggest. There is also a concern that 
the use of AWS will lead to moral disengagement and the expansion of the battle space.  
The operational solutions proposed for AWS are not enough to ensure meaningful 
compliance with IHL; instead, a legal regime is required. An outright ban would prevent 
any violations of IHL, but it is also unrealistic. A multilateral convention would bring 
stakeholders to the table and such conventions have been effective at regulating the use 
of weapons in the past. However, it may be too early in the development of AWS for 
states to reach a comprehensive agreement. Currently, individual states are creating 
codes of conduct for developing AWS. This is a practical short-term solution but does 
not adequately address the incremental development of AWS. A framework convention, 
which brings stakeholders to the table and enables the development of a multilateral 
convention over time, may offer the best solution to the regulation of AWS.  
It is crucial that a framework is developed before AWS become common on the 
battlefield, and the momentum of weapons development stymies meaningful regulation. 
It is unlikely that Isaac Asimov’s first law of robotics, that “[a] robot may not injure a 
human being…” has any place in the development of robotic weapons.143 However, 
through inaction we risk dehumanizing warfare and suffering significant humanitarian 
consequences.  
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